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Abstract 
International discourses on environment and development help to shape global shared 
understandings of environmental issues. This paper describes the environment and development 
history of Guyana and Jamaica through pre-colonial, colonial, independence and market 
liberalisation stages. Two opposing discourses are used to frame this history: a dominant global 
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environmental discourse characterised by technical and ‘scientific’ expertise and hierarchical 
governance; and a counter-discourse emphasising local control over natural resources. This 
analysis serves as a first step in surfacing and understanding the highly complex and 
multifaceted nature of environmental issues in these locations. However, we conclude with the 
recognition that further work should go beyond a bipolar analysis to one taking a critical, 
multidimensional approach, to promote more sustainable management of natural resources than 
has previously taken place. 
 
Introduction 
In most rural parts of the developing world, local communities rely almost exclusively on the 
quality, abundance and diversity of their local natural resources. Yet the way in which these 
resources have been managed has not always been in the hands of the people who depend on 
them. In fact, as a result of historical land and resource use expropriation, many people at a 
local level are subject to policies and practices set up by national governments and controlled 
by international institutions through the lenses of ‘development’ and/or ‘conservation’. These 
have been strongly influenced by international debates on environment and development which 
help to shape global shared understandings of issues. These common perceptions and 
discourses ‘construct meanings and relationships, helping to define common sense and 
legitimate knowledge’.1 
 
Dominant global environmental discourses more often than not contribute to the standardisation 
of problems, leading to the production of ‘blueprint’ solutions which are consequently 
translated into policy without local adaptation.2 This determines the flow and quantity of aid 
and funding,3 and promotes the redistribution or entrenchment of power and decision-making. 
Wardell and Reenberg and Sletto,4 for example, show how global discourses framed around 
 3 
environmental degradation and risk associated with the use of fire as a land management tool 
have privileged specific institutions (over local indigenous knowledge) in West African 
countries and Venezuela respectively. Politics and power underlie the gathering, representation 
and use of knowledge5 and are intimately bound within global and consequently national and 
institutional discourses.6 Power relations within discourses play a significant role in 
determining whose interests or knowledge are advanced or whose are suppressed or oppressed.7  
 
Discourses can be analysed by examining the ways in which their messages are communicated 
in the form of narratives or storylines.8 Environmental discourses have been categorised in 
different ways. Dobson, for example, makes the distinction between conservationism, reform 
environmentalism and radical ecologism.9 Dryzek goes much further and produces a 
classification based on the premises of global limits and their denial, environmental problem 
solving, sustainability and democratic green radicalism.10 
 
Many environmental discourse analyses differentiate the environmental debate according to 
two distinct discourses.11 The first of these points towards a dominant global environmental 
discourse characterised by technocentrism and managerialism, linked to general discourses of 
modernisation and, more recently, neoliberalism. This discourse promotes the centralisation of 
decision-making powers through mutually supporting scientific institutions, governments, 
multi-national industrial corporations (whether state controlled and/or private) and, recently, 
western conservation and development NGOs. Whichever political orientation, left or right, this 
global process of centralisation has consistently undermined local control over resource 
management, replacing it with a homogenised, ubiquitous and hierarchical administrative 
structure which increasingly de-skills and disempowers local communities. Secondly, a 
commonly associated counter-discourse emphasises an agenda of decentralisation through the 
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promotion of human rights, self determination and localised community-based and ecologically 
compatible approaches to environmental management. Examples include the emergence of the 
Indian Chipko movement in the 1970s; the Kenyan Green Belt Movement in the 1980s; the 
Mexican Zapatista movement in the mid-1990s; and the global Transition Towns Network in 
the 2000s. 
 
Both discourses depend on the clear identification of victims, villains and heroes. In the global 
environmental discourse, the local communities are both victims and villains; they are 
responsible for desertification, deforestation and biodiversity loss resulting from their over-
population and environmental mismanagement, but they are also the victims – stuck in a 
debilitating cycle of environmental degradation and poverty.12 The heroes are the technical, 
scientific, policy making and enterprising institutions which bring advanced technical know-
how and establish limits on exploitation through financial incentives and/or punitive 
restrictions. Solutions are devised by experts at the international level through global 
conventions and international bodies, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), Global Convention on Desertification and the Convention on Biological Diversity. The 
counter-discourse, variously described as ‘populist’ or ‘grassroots’, turns the situation on its 
head and identifies the centralising heroes as the villains, enslaving and subjugating the weak to 
channel resources towards powerful groups, depicted variously (depending on the political 
persuasion) as either ‘capitalist industrialists’ or ‘communist politbureau’. The new heroes in 
this discourse are the marginalised communities. Through a process of bottom-up and 
participatory engagement and, if deemed necessary, direct action/civil disobedience, these 
communities are able to wrestle back control of local resources and manage these sustainably 
and equitably. This discourse questions established scientific ‘truths’ and replaces these by the 
lived experiences of local communities. The villains of this discourse also become victims, as 
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the governing, expert and accumulating classes can no longer grow rich and powerful off the 
backs of disempowered communities and degraded environments. 
 
Although various authors have revelled in producing a myriad of sub-classifications amongst 
these two distinct discourses, the approach taken in this paper adopts Murray Bookchin’s basic 
view that the history of both social and natural evolution aligns itself according to two opposing 
forces: co-operative differentiation and hierarchical domination.13 History therefore unfolds as 
a battle between local communities committed to self-determination and elites aspiring to 
dominate them. In this paper, we narrate an environmental history of Guyana and Jamaica 
according to the influences of the dominant global environmental discourse and the 
populist/grassroots counter-discourse. In our analysis, we will draw upon these two polar 
opposites to show how, through history, local people have been subject to environmental and 
development interventions governed by the dominant discourses of the time. Our purpose is to 
simplify a highly complex history in order to first expose the manifestation of the two 
discourses described above, which, in turn, will hopefully allow a more nuanced interpretation 
of current developments. Our conclusions call for an analysis that goes beyond these polarised 
discourses towards capturing the multi/trans-scalar, differentiated and complex non-linear 
nature of natural resource dilemmas. 
 
The case studies have been chosen to represent the continental interior and island environments 
of the Caribbean. These have experienced different development pathways and local histories, 
though within the same framework of European colonisation through to independence and then 
to a progressively more globalised world. The interior of Guyana, comprised of a mosaic of 
dense tropical rain forest, savanna and wetland ecosystems, has been comparatively untouched 
by development until fairly recently due to its relative isolation. Jamaica, on the other hand, has 
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been chosen to represent the colonial and postcolonial pathway of the maritime Caribbean, 
characterised by radical deforestation and exploitative forms of agricultural and plantation land 
use. Coastal Guyana will also be considered with Jamaica where appropriate, as this area has a 
broadly similar colonial history to the Caribbean island territories. In selecting these English-
speaking former colonies, we are conscious that we have excluded territories which have 
experienced significantly different development pathways, such as Cuba, with its post 1950s 
socialist regime and the associated Cold War embargoes, the French départements 
(Guadeloupe, Martinique and Cayenne), and Haiti, which led the way to island independence in 
1804, but which suffered from the isolation that its early decades as an independent and 
perceived unstable state precipitated. 
 
Pre-colonial history 
The pre-colonial indigenous civilisations of Jamaica and Guyana (and the wider Caribbean as a 
whole), were characterised by relatively isolated communities focussing their subsistence on 
small-scale agriculture, hunting, gathering and occasional trade with and raids on adjoining 
communities. Communities had collective ownership of prescribed bio-regions underpinned by 
hierarchical decision-making structures focusing on determining the limits on natural resource 
extraction and trade/offensive actions with hostile/neighbouring communities. Otherwise, 
individuals had extensive freedoms with regard to when, where and to what extent they 
employed their labour and had direct control over their surrounding resources. Bookchin 
portrayed indigenous communities, such as these, as the closest society had ever got to with 
regards to populist/grassroots control.14 Nevertheless, one should be careful not to romanticise 
these cultures excessively since some practices, for example violent raiding activities for 
women, certainly do not fit within the narrative of present-day egalitarian and democratic 
decision making and personal freedoms. 
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Jamaica's earliest inhabitants were almost certainly the Ciboneys, a coastal dwelling group with 
mostly hunter-gatherer practices. Arawaks, originally a seagoing people, settled in Jamaica at 
around AD 650 and rapidly adopted a system of cultivated fields and gardens, which they had 
absorbed through their contact with other groups in the region of the Guianas and Venezuela.15 
In contrast to Jamaica, the indigenous population of Guyana was diverse, with various groups 
vying over the savanna, forest and wetland landscapes. Trade was important among the 
indigenous groups, and networks of alliances allowed the exchange of skills, knowledge and 
various food/non-food products. Prior to the arrival of Europeans, the Caribs, relative 
newcomers who may have moved north from Amazonia and progressively displaced the 
Arawaks, dominated the trading economy on the coast. Particular indigenous groups, such as 
the Caribs and Makushi, were also feared for their warrior skills; they frequently raided 
neighbouring communities for women and resources.16 
 
Most of these indigenous communities practised a basic form of shifting cultivation and grew a 
diversity of crops (most reproducing vegetatively from cuttings), including the staple cassava or 
manioc, which was used to produce a variety of edible products.17 Although favouring land 
with good drainage and light soils, lower hill slopes were also occasionally used. Forest was 
cleared by ring-barking and felling, and the vegetation was burned on the ground surface once 
dry. Plants such as cassava and sweet potato were typically grown on soil mounds which, 
according to Watts, caused little soil erosion.18 Local fruit trees were also grown, commonly in 
‘kitchen gardens’ adjacent to homes. Overall, this adaptive and relatively low density land-use 
system almost certainly caused little land degradation. Nor at this time was there large-scale 
forest clearance, as, for example, the Arawaks favoured grassland or secondary vegetation sites 
rather than mature rainforest sites.19 
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This discourse of a relatively egalitarian and sustainable society is important because it 
provides the ‘seed’ narrative for all subsequent populist ideas of local abilities to manage 
natural resources in sustainable ways while maintaining socially just cultures, without 
interference from external forces. 
 
Period of colonial first encounter and expansion 
The first encounters between local indigenous groups and European explorers may have been 
mostly amicable and mutually beneficial, with the predominant focus on trade. Jamaica was 
first visited by Christopher Columbus on his second voyage in 1494 and, although this was 
soon followed by Spanish trading posts, Jamaica attracted few Spanish settlers, and the Spanish 
had all but abandoned the island by around 1519. Europeans arrived in Guyana slightly later in 
the 1500s, but also there they quickly took advantage of trading opportunities in natural 
resources with indigenous people. By the 1620s a number of commercial trading posts had also 
been set up by the Dutch.20 
 
However, the establishment of trading posts soon developed into greater enterprises for the 
extraction of resources, such as timber, minerals, and, eventually, cash crops, for export to 
Europe. These activities spawned an insatiable demand for manual labour, initially supplied by 
allied indigenous communities raiding rival communities for slaves, but then increasingly 
supported by slavery from Africa. By this time, imported disease and the changing relationship 
from one of trade to one of subjugation began to decimate indigenous communities living in 
close proximity to European settlements. For example, in Jamaica the Arawaks were enslaved 
and brutalised by the Spanish, and animals introduced by the Spaniards (pigs, goats and cattle) 
destroyed unfenced Arawak fields and gardens, while epidemics such as smallpox inflicted 
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devastation on the remaining isolated settlements.21 Indigenous communities were either wiped 
out altogether, with the exception of a few isolated groups in the mountainous interior (as in 
Jamaica) or retreated inland (as in Guyana).22 
 
The initial curiosity and interest in indigenous practices (as reported by the first explorers who 
originated the idea of the ‘noble savage’) soon gave way to another discourse of indigenous 
peoples living an ‘unproductive life’ in the ‘wilderness’. The rapid extermination of large 
indigenous communities near European settlements reinforced the idea of indigenous people 
occupying an empty land. The inability to commodify and mass produce traditional resources 
also contributed significantly to the increasing narration of previously indigenous land as 
‘wilderness’ unoccupied by no-one except a few vagrant groups struggling to maintain a bare 
existence. This development went on to contribute towards the emerging global narratives of 
wild pristine environments untainted by human hands.23 
 
Colonial plantations 
The establishment of the colonial plantation economy developed at great pace on the accessible 
coastal regions of the Caribbean, driven firstly by slave labour from Africa and later by 
indentured immigrants from India. As the sugarcane plantations were established as a major 
industry in the Caribbean, firstly on Española from the 1530s,24 the wholesale destruction of the 
coastal forests commenced through the progressive depletion of both flora and fauna. Thus the 
roots of Caribbean environmental degradation lie in the history of the extractive plantation 
economies and the colonial legacy. Concomitant with the establishment of the plantation 
industry, there was a parallel scramble in the late 1600s to define and consolidate territorial 
sovereignty with, for example, the exploration of the Guiana Shield watershed divide which 
determined frontier borders between British, Dutch, French and Portuguese colonial powers.25 
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The Spanish monopoly of territory in the Caribbean was progressively challenged by northern 
European states throughout the sixteenth century, and lands unoccupied by the Spanish were 
colonised by others from the 1620s onwards.26 After a phase of changing hands in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, often mirroring conflicts in Europe,27 the Caribbean 
islands also settled into permanent sovereignty which lasted for the remainder of the colonial 
period.  
 
Territorial expansion in Guyana was justified on the pretext of protecting the rights of 
indigenous subjects.28 First, alliances were made with indigenous groups, who were then 
‘honoured’ with the status of British subjects. However, implicit within this bequest was that, 
on becoming a British subject, the colonists could claim rightful ownership of the territory. At 
the same time, as elsewhere in the empire, humanitarian arguments, namely protecting the 
‘poor Indians’ and making them ‘civilised’, spearheaded by colonial charitable enterprises and 
religious missions, were used as a means to annex indigenous lands, which were subsequently 
administered as Crown lands.29 
 
Initial laws on natural resource use conceded a special status to the ‘Aboriginal Indians of the 
Colony’ by recognising their ‘traditional rights and privileges’ to hunt, fish, gather and cultivate 
wherever they wished on Crown lands, without need for a special permit.30 However, as 
colonial interests in resource extraction became more important, rights were revoked, and under 
Ordinance No. 12 of 1871, the Governor of British Guiana assumed authority to define ‘the 
privileges to be enjoyed by the Aboriginal Indians, in relation to the Rivers, Creeks, Crown 
Lands and Forests of the Colony and may in like manner, cancel, alter and amend any of such 
regulations’. After 1887, all indigenous rights to use forests and land granted to loggers, 
miners, balata (wild rubber) collectors and ranchers were restricted.31 
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Thus, the Guyanese interior remained relatively undisturbed in terms of land use conversion. 
Most logging was confined to the coastal forests and limited to specific species the timber of 
which had high export value. These included the greenheart (Ocotea rodiae), a hardwood 
valued for marine use in the UK and US; Mora, exported widely for use as railway sleepers; 
and Dalli, exported to Suriname for making plywood. The industry was constrained by a 
modest market, limited technology and limited access to forest resources, and controlled by a 
small Forest Department still in its infancy.32 Most mining, for gold, was small-scale and 
confined to the banks of rivers and streams. Ranching, although extensive, occurred using the 
natural savannas as pasture. Nevertheless, the impact on the indigenous people was severe. The 
gradual expropriation of land rights meant that indigenous people had restricted access to 
former traditional resource use areas. For their livelihoods, many became increasingly reliant 
on the interior industries of ranching, logging and mining. The exploitative nature of these 
relationships brought about further conflict, abuse and detrimental socio-economic conditions 
for indigenous people. This was further exacerbated by the lack of services and development 
assistance for the interior populations by the colonial government, which was mainly concerned 
with issues around the coastal economy.33 
 
Once the flurry over frontier establishment and territorial absorption as Crown land subsided in 
the 1830s, the colonial powers focused on the business of plantations, and the Guyanese 
interior with its remaining indigenous populations was neglected in favour of more productive 
coastal regions. Thus, Guyana was effectively divided into two, its coastal region paralleling 
Jamaica’s plantation-based economic history while its interior was left ‘undeveloped’ apart 
from relatively minor resource extractive activities and missionary endeavours. Thus, by the 
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1840s, the colonial state no longer required indigenous people except as labour for the 
peripheral industries in timber, balata, gold and cattle-raising in the interior. 
 
Whereas the Guyanese hinterland was now relegated to a ‘wild and unproductive backwater’, 
both the Guyanese coastal zone and Jamaica as a whole underwent rapid transformation into 
industrial agriculture. The large area, difficult swampy conditions and relative isolation with 
respect to the main trading routes, meant that the pressures for development (and associated 
degradation) in coastal Guyana were limited. However, the restricted area and hilly terrain of 
Jamaica began to experience the pressures of environmental degradation. Although there are 
few written records of the process, Watts cites written and scientific evidence of the progressive 
deterioration of soil resources throughout the insular Caribbean, following the consolidation of 
sugar cane plantations and the expansion of these and the slaves’ provision grounds on to 
progressively more marginal and hillslope sites prior to emancipation.34 
 
By 1665, almost all of the Caribbean coastal forests had been converted to plantations with 
only isolated pockets of natural forest remaining in the smaller islands, such as Barbados and 
St. Kitts. In Jamaica, the 18th century also resulted in the clearance of large tracts of highlands 
for coffee plantations (gradually abandoned through the 19th century due to depression in the 
industry and hillside degradation).35 Thus the extermination of the indigenous population was 
followed by the destruction of native fauna and flora. In just under three hundred years 
following European arrival, both the natural and cultural landscapes were unrecognisable. This 
manifested the apex of domination of both nature and society: people, flora and fauna were 
subjugated to producing resources for augmenting the centralising and hegemonic European 
masters. Any opposition to this had either been wiped out or relegated to the fringes. 
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The creation of new ‘local others’ 
The release from slavery led to the appearance of a new ‘local’ underclass in the coastal 
Caribbean, in addition to the surviving pockets of indigenous communities within the interior 
of Guyana. The distinct difference in Jamaica’s and coastal Guyana’s physical geography, the 
former limited in extent and hilly, and the latter extensive and flat, meant that the emancipation 
of slavery led to different environmental outcomes. In Jamaica, the emancipation of slaves in 
1838 unwittingly exacerbated environmental deterioration. The freed slaves, invariably denied 
access to the best land still held by plantation owners, were forced on to poorer soils and/or 
more steeply sloping hillside and lowland marshlands, in order to establish their subsistence. 
Although there are no reliable records, deforestation of Jamaica's hillsides would have 
increased at this time. This played into the global environmental discourse of local 
communities unable to manage their environment adequately. 
 
An early commentator on the state of Jamaica’s hillsides was Jamaica’s Director of Roads, 
Robert Thornton, in 1877: ‘There are probably few British colonies which afford more striking 
illustration of the effects of the wholesale destruction of the aboriginal forest than is 
exemplified by this colony.’36 Taking on this theme, in 1881, the first official report on the 
problem of forest destruction blamed the problem on the ‘reckless’ cutting down of forests by 
small farmers practising shifting cultivation.  Morris, Jamaica’s Director of Public Gardens and 
Plantations at that time, blamed both the government and private landholders for this situation; 
the former for allowing something like 30,000 acres of forest to be cleared each year, and the 
latter for abandoning cleared land after only one or two cropping seasons.37 
 
At around this time, Morris and others began to make links between deforestation and an 
apparently increasing incidence of droughts. The likely consequences of deforestation on the 
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Jamaican climate led to the delimiting of forest reserves at the end of the 19th century 
(although these were not formally enacted in law until 1927). By the 1920s, the issue of 
deforestation had been refocused as an agricultural problem, and had become one of replacing 
the perceived (by colonial administrators) inefficiencies and environmentally damaging effects 
of shifting agriculture with more permanent forms of cultivation. In the 1930s, soil 
conservation became a prominent feature of agricultural policy across the British tropical 
colonies. The prevention of soil erosion provided a justification for interfering in traditional 
patterns of land use and was an important aspect of a transition to a more interventionist 
colonial policy that took place at that time, particularly in East Africa,38 but also in Jamaica and 
throughout the Caribbean. This was undoubtedly facilitated in the Caribbean by the activities of 
the recently established Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad, which provided 
graduates who joined the Colonial service as agricultural officers. In Jamaica, agricultural 
practices that were identified as particularly problematic included fire clearance, digging of 
plots at the end of the dry season, inappropriate locations for hillside drains and short-term 
tenancies.39 
 
Central, therefore, to the emerging global discourse of environmental degradation was a view 
that the emancipated slaves were the principal agents of degradation and were largely ignorant 
of effective soil management techniques. Little notice was taken of their traditional technical 
knowledge. As Blaikie argues, the assumptions on which environmental policy was based in 
the colonial period underline the strengthening discourse: (i) the problem is identified as an 
environmental one; (ii) local ignorance is a key factor in environmental mismanagement; (iii) 
overpopulation contributes; and (iv) increasing the incentive to practice ‘modern’ methods is 
stimulated by incorporation of traditional farmers into the market economy.40 
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Postcolonial socialist period 
When Guyana became independent in 1966, its economy was wholly dependent on exports, 
mainly sugar, rice, bauxite, some minerals and specialist timbers, owned in the main by British 
and American companies. Two years prior, in the elections of 1964, the British colonial 
authorities had used race politics skilfully to unseat the Indo-Guyanese Cheddi Jagan’s 
democratically elected, but supposedly communist, People’s Progressive Party government.41 
The Afro-Guyanese opposition People’s National Congress (PNC) leader, Forbes Burnham, 
succeeded as Prime Minister through a coalition with the right-wing United Force (UF), which 
had the support of businesses, churches, and through them, the indigenous people. However, 
this partnership between the PNC and UF soon dissolved and Burnham proceeded to govern in 
full authoritarian style, declaring Guyana a ‘Cooperative Republic’ in 1970 and instilling a 
programme of ‘socialist’ reforms.42 
 
There is relatively little ideological distinction between Jamaica’s two principal political 
parties, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) and the People's National Party (PNP). Both of these 
arose from Jamaica's burgeoning post-war trade unions movements. By the time of Jamaica's 
independence in 1962, bauxite had become the most significant single item in Jamaica's trade 
profile. Michael Manley, soon to become leader of the PNP and Jamaica's Prime Minister 
between 1972 and 1980, eloquently details the central position of bauxite in Jamaica's ever-
growing trade deficit and the colonial and US-driven exploitation of this natural resource.43 
This was a major factor in Manley’s growing perception that third world governments in 
general and the Jamaican government in particular required a different structural approach to 
independence – a socialist path. As Prime Minister from 1972, Manley sought closer ties with 
the Communist bloc, including Cuba, and closer control of Jamaica's natural resources. By 
1975, Jamaica had followed the Guyanese route by raising the price of bauxite, and had 
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purchased 51 percent of the Jamaican holdings of the multinationals (mainly US and Canadian) 
which controlled Jamaica's bauxite industry, had raised taxes on these companies and had 
sought to purchase large areas of land owned by the bauxite companies.44 However, by 1980, 
Manley’s ‘socialist path’ had led to economic chaos, including a decimation of the tourist 
industry (fuelled by negative North American media reports of rising crime), huge rates of 
migration of Jamaican professionals to North America, and internal social instability.45 The 
collapse in world bauxite prices through the late 1970s, in the wake of the oil crises and 
introduction of neoliberalism as global economic discourse, exacerbated Jamaica's problems. 
Jamaica turned to the IMF for support in 1979 but failed to raise foreign exchange, according to 
Manley due to gross miscalculations by the IMF of the value of Jamaican economy.46  
 
Throughout this period Manley, himself a land owner and farmer, attempted to promote 
Jamaica's domestic agricultural sector, which had continued to suffer from poor soils, low 
economic returns, restricted access by small farmers to good agricultural land, and the 
progressive migration of male farmers to cities and abroad. However, despite significant FAO 
input and USAID support, and significant capacity building within the Ministry of Agriculture 
including the creation of the Soil Conservation Division and the Natural Resources 
Conservation Division, domestic agriculture remained in a parlous condition.47 Although 
Manley returned to power in 1989, he had significantly softened his political stance, and a more 
pragmatic, if still socialistic, programme was pursued until he resigned amid growing ill health 
in 1992. 
 
The theorists of socialist ideology often portray the practice of their creed as a process of 
emancipation and empowerment of oppressed and subjugated sectors of society. Yet, as 
Burnham and Manley demonstrated, the removal of colonial ‘oppression’ only resulted in its 
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replacement by another form of centralised control, which, although reducing the levels of 
extreme inequalities amongst the population, did little to devolve decision-making control to 
local communities. If anything, power was centralised even further. This was exemplified in 
Guyana by the brutal repression of a local move for autonomous determination in the Rupununi 
region, with dire consequences for the local indigenous population who were subsequently 
further neglected in terms of services and development.48 
 
Both Guyana and Jamaica experienced a shift in the discourse of environmental degradation 
and poverty during the 1970s, from one blaming local communities to one which accused 
foreign neocolonial extractive practices of exacerbating the local situation. The new emphasis 
was now on land husbandry and self sufficiency (but still directed through centralised control). 
This mirrored, in the global context, a growing influence of neo-Marxist approaches to 
development theory, and called for the recognition of environmental degradation as a social 
problem arising from inequality. As such, this required social as well as technical solutions 
including commitment to changes in social policy.49 The new autarchic economic development 
policies favoured state intervention and the nationalisation of natural resources and their 
associated industries, and restricted foreign and private investment.  
 
Help for these state initiatives was sought from international organisations and foreign expert 
knowledge. In Guyana, for example, between 1978 and 1987 the World Bank and IMF tried to 
promote public-sector productivity in the interior by investing over US$35 million in the 
newly-established state-owned company, Demerara Woods Ltd., but poor financial 
management and lack of capacity in forestry meant that the company soon ran into debt.50 
Likewise in Jamaica, several projects were funded in the 1980s and 1990s by organisations 
such as FAO, USAID and the EU to control soil erosion (one of the main causes of 
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environmental degradation within the country).51 Although bench terracing was fostered by 
FAO experts as being the best method of soil conservation, it soon became obvious that this 
and other technologies were inappropriate in the local agricultural and economic conditions.52 
Political objectives were ostensibly being met, but without fundamental improvements in 
perceived (in the absence of any measurement) levels of soil erosion, and hence by extension, 
land degradation.  
 
Mismanagement, corruption and political reluctance to support local autonomous enterprise led 
to seriously declining economies where basic foods, fuels and goods became unavailable and 
local hardship prevailed. In Guyana especially, but also Jamaica, more educated and well 
connected citizens emigrated, leaving those behind to face increasing poverty. Nevertheless, a 
period of relative isolation of both countries from direct foreign exploitation did result in some 
natural resources, such as forests and mineral resources in Guyana, being protected behind the 
closed doors of ‘cooperative socialism’. On the whole, the failure of these socialist experiments 
not only acted to reinforce the global environmental discourse indicating that local 
communities were incapable of managing their own resources sustainably and lifting 
themselves out of poverty, but needed the intervention of external expertise. 
 
Neoliberal structural adjustment 
The collapse of socialist governance, first in Jamaica and then later in Guyana, and ultimately 
internationally, established once and for all the hegemonic technocentrism and managerialism 
of the global environmental and development discourse. The process established during the 
colonial period now comes back with a vengeance - external western intervention is seen as the 
solution. The principal mechanism is liberalisation of markets through the removal of trade 
barriers and a ‘stimulus’ of national industries through debt-based investment. Underlying these 
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major trends is a process of technology and knowledge transfer through the parachuting of 
western expertise to address problems arising from ‘local ignorance’. It is no coincidence that 
this period is commonly termed ‘neocolonial’.53 
 
By the late 1980s, Guyana’s and Jamaica’s economies were in states of near collapse. When 
Guyana’s socialist Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, unexpectedly died in 1985, most natural 
resource industries including sugar, bauxite and timber had run up huge deficits, public 
infrastructure had fallen into disrepair and the standard of living had decreased dramatically. In 
Jamaica, the government was increasingly turning to the IMF and the World Bank for 
assistance, entering into no fewer than 18 agreements between 1981 and 1992.  
 
From the late 1980s, there was a marked shift in emphasis – from one focusing on pursuing 
agricultural sector adjustment loans to one of liberalisation, deregulation and institutional 
reform.54 In both Guyana and Jamaica, government progressively withdrew from direct 
intervention in agriculture under a wave of new structural adjustment programmes, and in the 
face of declining global raw materials prices and mounting external debts. This paved the way 
for a series of neoliberal economic reforms and in 1988 Guyana adopted an Economic 
Recovery Plan (ERP) as part of an IMF-supervised programme of structural adjustment.55 Key 
to the ERP was attracting foreign investment in natural resource production, privatising former 
state holdings and divesting state lands.56 
 
The impact of this process of globalisation has had a number of effects. Firstly, small producers 
were placed under severe hardship as trade liberalisation resulted in an influx of cheap 
products.57 This led to the collapse of many small domestic agricultural and natural resource 
enterprises. For example, when tariffs on imported skimmed milk powder were reduced, the 
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Jamaican dairy industry collapsed, compounded by food aid policies (in 2003, the US 
government donated 4500 metric tonnes of skimmed milk powder to Jamaica to be used to 
expand the national School Feeding Programme). Other examples of decline in Jamaican 
agricultural production have been the fall in production, between 1995 and 2004, of local 
carrots by 35 percent, potatoes by 62 percent, and onions by 89 percent.58 
 
Domestic enterprises were replaced in Guyana by large multi-national conglomerates which 
were principally interested in extracting the raw materials for processing elsewhere. This is 
highlighted in Guyana, where in 1986 the Guyana Natural Resources Agency was established 
with World Bank assistance to promote private-sector investment in logging and mining. 
Exports in sugar, rice, gold and timber increased following the adoption of the ERP, a period in 
which GDP rose an average of 6 per cent per year.59 However, closer examination of the terms 
under which foreign companies were allowed to exploit natural resources such as timber, 
highlighted tax exemptions for foreign companies, long-term fixed royalty payments in 
Guyanese dollars and permission to employ at least 15 percent foreign workers, with effective 
regulatory government institutions absent, resulting in over-exploitation and what Colchester 
terms ‘enclavistic’ development.60 This, together with cutbacks in government spending on 
health and education, public-sector redundancies and the decline in real earnings resulting from 
inflation and devaluation, did little to ameliorate the poor socio-economic status of the 
population.61 
 
Although it is evident that environmental degradation is occurring on, for example, Jamaica’s 
hillside farms, without accurate quantitative information of how much and where this degradation 
is occurring, there is a supposition by the authorities that the adoption of external conservation 
prescriptions is the answer. This is inevitably drawn from the narrative surrounding the problem 
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rather than from empirical investigation of soil erosion, which hardly exists.62 The indigenous 
mechanisms whereby local communities cope with their situation have frequently been 
overlooked. Impoverishment of local communities has been further exacerbated by increasing 
incidences of more extreme climatic conditions,63 particularly damaging early-season droughts 
and a greater occurrence of high magnitude rainfall/hurricane events during the main agricultural 
season. In a recent survey of Jamaican farmers growing food for the domestic and north coast 
tourist markets in semi-arid southern St Elizabeth, farmers were well aware of increasingly 
hazardous climatic conditions (a combination of longer and more frequent droughts and more 
unpredictable episodes of torrential rainfall).64 In Guyana, coastal agriculture has been repeatedly 
affected by severe flooding caused by high rainfall coinciding with high tides and failures in sea 
defence infrastructure (most coastal agricultural land is below sea level).65 
 
The process of external intervention has resulted in the progressive erosion of local resilience 
and adaptability which has not been adequately replaced by state intervention. For example, 
despite the existence of relief structures set up following Hurricane Gilbert (1988), the 
Jamaican government struggled to provide appropriate relief following two successive years 
(2004 and 2005) where early-season droughts were succeeded by a stormy rainy season.66 This 
has resulted in a resurgence of the populist discourse where local solutions are sought for the 
combined threats of land degradation and external control. For example, some Jamaican 
farmers have developed a range of strategies to cope with drought hazards, including mulching 
(to reduce moisture loss), use of drip irrigation, a switch to more drought resistant crops, and 
diversification of income generation.67 This discourse highlights that blueprint policy 
prescriptions do not take account of the instabilities, uncertainties and complexities of many 
parts of the developing world, and so as Adger et al. point out, ‘since global discourses are 
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often based on shared myths and blueprints of the world, the political prescriptions flowing 
from them are often inappropriate for local realities’.68 
 
Commodification of the environment 
The evolving global environmental discourse has increasingly compensated for the failures of 
the neoliberal free-trade approach in addressing environmental degradation through an attempt 
at monetising environmental externalities. The first wave emerged in the 1990s, in response to 
the Earth Summit of 1992, where ‘sustainable development’ emerged as the dominant 
narrative. The imperative behind this was the permanent integration of existing local natural 
resource products for the global market (as opposed to their replacement by short-term large-
scale monocultures, clear-felling and strip mining). For example, a major emphasis was placed 
on the bioprospecting enterprise,69 where the protection of biodiversity would be paid for by the 
commercialisation of medical properties of traditional remedies. This was seen as a ‘win-win-
win’ situation: western pharmaceutical corporations would make a profit; local communities 
would derive an income from this; and biodiversity would be protected as a result. Other 
examples included international ecotourism, extractive reserves for wild products (e.g. Brazil 
nuts), sustainable forestry and payments for ecosystem services (e.g. carbon banks). Jamaica’s 
natural forests have long been decimated. However, Guyana still contains a significant portion 
of South America’s relatively undisturbed rainforest. The growing importance of this resource 
has proved to be the stimulus for international initiatives, and we turn to this to complete the 
narrative. 
 
In Guyana, the Iwokrama International Centre (371,000 hectares of primary rainforest) was 
established in 1996 with considerable funding from the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) as well as the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID).70 
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The aim of the enterprise was to develop a market for local natural resources, principally 
through sustainable logging, ecotourism and bioprospecting, e.g. traditional medicinal products, 
aquarium fish and butterflies. In 2006, Guyana's President Bharrat Jagdeo went a step further 
by offering to place almost the entirety of Guyana's rainforest (75 percent of the country’s 
territory) under international supervision as part of the world's battle against climate change.71 
Describing the rainforest as a ‘global asset in the fight against climate change’,72 he appealed to 
the British government and non-governmental organizations to assist Guyana in safeguarding it 
through bilateral investments in conservation and sustainable development. President Jagdeo’s 
offer came just as Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) was 
put on the global agenda at the 2007 climate change talks in Bali - the big new market-based 
solution to save the planet from runaway climate change.73 To finance REDD, the World Bank 
launched the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), aimed at reducing deforestation and 
forest degradation by compensating developing countries for greenhouse gas emission 
reductions. 
 
One mechanism for implementing REDD is through payments for ecosystem services (PES).74 
In March 2008, the investment firm Canopy Capital and the related environmental alliance 
known as the Global Canopy Programme (GCP) signed a preliminary agreement with the 
Iwokrama International Centre to help finance the protected area for five years in return for 
‘ownership’ of forest ecosystem services, including carbon retention, rainfall generation and 
climate regulation, and a claim in any future profits.75 Canopy Capital is looking at marketing 
ecosystem services through an ‘Ecosystem Service Certificate’ attached to a 10-year tradable 
bond, the interest from which will pay for the maintenance of the Iwokrama forest.76 PES is 
also being implemented in the second phase of the Guiana Shield Initiative (GSI) project, 
started in January 2007 and funded by the EU and UNDP.77 In Guyana, the Iwokrama 
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International Centre has been chosen as a pilot site, and as well as setting up financial 
mechanisms for rewarding and compensating the conservation of ecosystem services, the 
initiative incorporates the original objectives of promoting income generation through market-
oriented activities such as eco-tourism, and the sustainable harvesting of timber and non-timber 
forest products. In July 2008, Guyana was named as one of the initial countries to benefit from 
funding from the FCPF.78 This funding is targeted at establishing emissions reference levels, 
adopting REDD strategies, and designing monitoring systems.  
 
Incorporating environmental externalities into the market economy reflects a belief that the 
dynamic behaviour of the capitalist system changes from one of unlimited growth to one where 
environmental limits feed back to balance growth within sustainable limits. ‘Capital thus 
develops a conservationist tendency, significantly different from its usual reckless, destructive 
form’.79 However, significant questions still remain on how one can value environmental 
externalities such as biodiversity loss, the effects of greenhouse gas emissions and ecosystem 
services. More significantly, the capitalisation of nature would further exacerbate the 
consolidation of control within global centres of the market economy.  
 
The considerable activity for ‘sustainable development’ in Guyana has also led to the 
development of a new global counter-discourse. The emergence of a grassroots movement for 
self-determination could be described as the coming together of a series of groups – first 
Amerindian, then African slaves, then indentured East Indians, and most recently, thanks to the 
globalisation of communication and movement of peoples, into a single global movement 
sharing a common history of oppression from colonial masters to national state autocratic 
monopolies to the global capitalist system.80 This national and international, amorphous and 
multi-distributed group has raised a series of questions on the accuracy of figures produced in 
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order to gain funding, the transparency of national institutions, the continued exploitation of 
natural resources only for export, as well as the lack of consultation and participation of local 
indigenous communities and their land rights issues.81  With reference to the establishment of 
Iwokrama in 1996, the Makushi leader, Sidney Allicock, admits that, 
…in the beginning…Iwokrama was not a good example of democratic decision-making. 
There was no authentic consultation with Guyanese as a whole, nor with indigenous 
peoples as a major group. Iwokrama began as a big political decision with a vision….that 
did not harness, at the outset, the views, fears, hopes or interests of the rights 
holders/stakeholders – the Makushi and other peoples whose lands and the sacred and 
spiritual values as well as their modern aspirations were at stake.82  
 
Furthermore, although there have been consecutive bouts of multilateral and bilateral funding 
for indigenous communities living in and around proposed protected areas83 – areas that could 
be used as future ‘carbon banks’ or ‘PES banks’ – there are increasing protests from local 
indigenous communities seeking to settle outstanding land rights issues. Serious questions have 
been raised on who is to gain from these new initiatives: international corporations/national 
elites or local communities? 
 
Conclusion 
So far, we have attempted to draw a common Caribbean history of environment and 
development by focusing on two distinct localities, Jamaica and interior Guyana, through the 
lens of a dominant centralising global discourse and its populist antithesis. Although the 
histories of both our case studies were subdivided into distinct and parallel phases of, for 
example, colonial expansion, independence and market liberalisation, this history can be 
characterised as a process of control over natural resources and local communities being 
appropriated by ‘elite’ groups. These include European colonial powers, national autocrats, 
neocolonial influences and international institutions such as private multinational corporations, 
multilateral funding bodies and non-governmental organisations. The populist reaction is 
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instead in diametric opposition to the centralising process: ad hoc, geographically 
differentiated, with an evolving and diverse membership. 
 
The environmental history we have outlined illustrates that from precolonial times, knowledge 
and epistemic framings of the Caribbean environment have been co-constructed through 
dominant discursive regimes leading to particular political, economic, social and ecological 
outcomes. The power of whose knowledge counts in this story indicates that from colonial 
times to current paradigms of environmental commodification, Western scientific/technical 
knowledge has led politics, policy and practice. ‘Unproductive’ indigenous peoples, farmers as 
ignorant degraders of land, and other notions of local people have been used to appropriate 
land, marginalise populations and embed technologies not wholly appropriate for the local 
contexts. The environmental governance emanating from these discourses has also led to the 
‘enclosure’ of natural resources, thus restricting landscapes and environment for some, while 
opening them up for others. This continues to the present day, with the current global initiative 
to mitigate against climate change by protecting natural resources, such as forests in Guyana, is 
a case in point. 
 
However, Adger et al. warn of simplistic differentiation of discourses and associated actors, 
noting that the actual evolution of environmental/social events in particular localities does not 
neatly correspond to these categories.84 Conversely, Pepper argues that a polarising approach 
can at least serve as a useful device for stimulating dialogue by simplifying highly complex and 
multifaceted issues to give us ‘a toehold by which we can elevate ourselves eventually to a 
higher understanding of complex reality’.85 In our own experience, we constantly encountered 
paradoxes and schizophrenic thoughts and behaviours amongst policy makers, activists, 
scientists and local communities.86 Indeed, as Bulkan and Bulkan note, the individuals who 
 27 
constitute ‘local communities’ respond differently, making it very difficult to categorise these 
groups exclusively as victims, villains or heroes.87 Thus, one may disagree with the process of 
differentiating history according to the battle of two polar opposites. It could be argued that it is 
this division into distinct and intractable positions which prevents the constructive resolution of 
both human poverty and environmental degradation. Forsyth points to a more critical approach 
to analysing environmental issues which examines concepts such as scientific ‘explanations’ 
and ‘accuracy’ in-depth, incorporates institutional realism and poststructural analyses, and 
gives more attention to biophysical agency.88  
 
The main purpose of this paper, therefore, is not to reinforce the perception of an elitist/populist 
divide by labelling particular individuals as victims, villains and heroes. The tensions of the 
polar opposites are manifest within each one of us and the challenge is to be able to expose 
these tensions explicitly and identify a balance. We argue that this can only be accomplished by 
more nuanced and multidimensional approaches, to promote more sustainable management of 
natural resources than has taken place hitherto in Guyana and Jamaica, and throughout the 
wider Caribbean. 
 
One such approach is systems thinking and practice, which engages with complex situations by 
identifying 'systems', clarifying their purpose, and exploring how they transform the 
environment within which they are nested.89 In particular, a 'critical systems' approach 
acknowledges that 'systems' do not exist 'out there', but are instead created by us as mental 
models so as to facilitate our engagement with what would otherwise be a world which 
overwhelms us with information.90 Thus, a system's purpose is determined not only by the 
apparently factual (objective) information available, but also by the modeller's worldview 
which selectively integrates this information to present a system which is compatible with the 
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modeller's conscious, but more often than not, unconscious, agenda. This is especially the case 
with those individuals who claim to be 'objective'. Hence, discourse analysis is an attempt to 
create distinct narratives, each with a distinct purpose, for example to forward the interests of 
the narrative's 'heroes' and undermine those of the narrative's 'villains'. Yet, systems do not 
operate in a vacuum; they are enmeshed in a network of feedback processes between system 
components (subsystems), the supra-systems within which they are embedded, and other 
systems within the environment with which they exchange energy, matter and information. 
Hence, for example, the 'bottom-up' counter-discourse's coherence begins to fall apart when 
you consider how local groups, in their attempts to overcome pressures from national 
governments, 'jump scale' to form alliances with international NGOs.91  
 
Thus, to disentangle such complex interrelationships between actors within different temporal, 
spatial and organisational scales requires a significantly more sophisticated approach. This 
paper has identified the gross pattern of, and historic influences on, natural resource 
management in two contrasting Caribbean situations. Each of the historical phases examined in 
the paper has acted as a palimpsest on the present-day situation, promoting complexity and 
underlining the inadequacy of ‘traditional’ and inevitably linear approaches to natural resource 
management. We would argue that the next step in interpreting the environmental history of 
Guyana and Jamaica requires a critical systems approach, and the application of critical 
systems methodology. Developing such an approach is beyond the scope of the present paper, 
which should therefore serve as a stepping stone for those wishing to develop a deeper 
understanding of the environmental history of Guyana and Jamaica. 
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